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The current crisis exposed weaknesses in the application of accounting standards and gaps associated 
with the valuation of ﬁ  nancial products. During the upturn, the revaluation of assets, build-up of off-balance 
sheet claims, and booking of unrealised gains obscured risk exposures taken by ﬁ  nancial institutions.
But as we have learned, when the cycles turn, the downward trends and uncertainties in the value
of assets may lead to negative dynamics that may exaggerate the trough of the cycle. This is generally 
accepted, but we need to be more symmetrical in our approach: increasing valuations in the upturns can 
also create the incentives, through more proﬁ  ts, compensations and dividends, to purchase more of the 
appreciating assets and thereby exacerbate the peak. All this raises legitimate questions regarding the role 
of risk management systems, accounting standards and regulations in creating adequate incentives and 
conveying information on a ﬁ  nancial entity’s risk proﬁ  le throughout the business cycle. More fundamentally, 
it raises questions about whether marking-to-market provides the necessary objective representation
or may contribute to mispricing of risk during upturns and injecting artiﬁ  cial risk during downturns and thus 
distorting the information value of prices. 
Changing accounting standards at the height of the crisis would risk adversely impacting investor conﬁ  dence 
and should be avoided. Furthermore, fair value accounting is the direction to go, but going forward,
there is a need to revisit the implications of accounting standards on behavior and incentives, especially during 
good times, with a view to making possible adjustments to current accounting practices. Inconsistencies
of accounting standards with best risk management practices and prudential norms can be very expensive 
for ﬁ  nancial stability. Governance and risk management within ﬁ  nancial institutions need to be improved, 
and supervisors should scrutinise more carefully internal processes and controls, as well as valuation
and stress testing methodologies.
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U
ntil mid-2007, global ﬁ  nancial markets were 
characterised by low premia on ﬁ  nancial 
assets which emboldened investors to 
venture down the “credit ladder” in search of higher 
returns. While the coming of a correction should not 
have been a surprise to anyone, several factors have 
contributed to turning a correction into a ﬁ  nancial 
crisis. These include:
￿  lax underwriting standards, risk management 
failures, and compensation schemes that may have 
encouraged excessive risk taking;
￿  weaknesses in structured product design and 
pricing at origination, including lack of transparency 
about underlying risks of structured products,
and shortcomings in modeling and valuation
of such products;
￿ lack of investor due diligence and herding behavior, 
including weaknesses due to the inability to assess 
risks as investors accumulated their experience only 
during good times;
￿  and the collective failure to understand the 
magnitude and implications of the leverage 
accumulated by a wide range of institutions using 
existing and innovative ﬁ  nancial  mechanisms.
The combination of a highly leveraged ﬁ  nancial 
system and a sudden lack of conﬁ  dence in the 
valuation of assets has proved to be quite harmful.
This article refers to two different but interrelated 
topics, valuation of ﬁ   nancial instruments and 
fair value accounting. The current crisis exposed 
weaknesses in the implementation of accounting 
standards and gaps associated with the valuation 
of ﬁ  nancial products. The role of these weaknesses 
in the ﬁ  nancial crisis should not be exaggerated, 
but they have been important enough to require a 
thorough analysis of their impact. Current practices 
of marking-to-market, combined with inadequate 
valuation and risk management models, may have 
contributed to inefﬁ  ciencies both by mispricing 
risk during the upturn and by injecting artiﬁ  cial 
risk premia during the ensuing downturn, and 
thus distorting the information value of prices.
The abnormally tight market liquidity conditions 
during the crisis intensiﬁ  ed discussions on the 
role of fair value in contributing to its severity.1
While much effort is being devoted to improve 
valuation practices under market stress, the central 
thesis of this note is that a symmetrical treatment is 
needed. The seeds of the problem were planted in 
good times. It was then when leverage and excessive 
risk was accumulated, and therefore the speciﬁ  cs
of fair value accounting and its implementation
that may shape incentives in good times also need 
to be revisited. This note aims to contribute to this 
much-needed policy debate. 
Changing accounting standards in the midst of 
the crisis would risk adversely affecting investor 
conﬁ   dence and should be avoided. Fair value 
accounting should be maintained –alternative 
techniques have their own shortcomings. However, 
there is a need to revisit the implications of existing 
accounting standards on behavior and incentives, 
especially during good times, with a view to 
making possible adjustments. A strengthening of 
accounting standards to take into account their 
implications throughout the business cycle is needed 
to help eliminate or at least substantially reduce 
inconsistencies with best risk management practices 
and prudential norms. Prudential supervisors have 
a signiﬁ  cant role to play and should scrutinise more 
carefully internal valuation processes and controls, 
as well as pricing and stress testing methodologies– 
especially during the upturn. All this makes it critical 
for regulators, accounting standard setters, and the 
industry to join forces to better align the supervisory, 
risk management and accounting guidelines. This is 
essential to safeguard ﬁ  nancial stability. 
VALUATION PRACTICES:
IMPLICATIONS THROUGHOUT THE BUSINESS CYCLE
The main objective of accounting standard setters 
is to ensure that ﬁ  nancial statement information 
is measured in a way that is clearly deﬁ  ned, 
economically meaningful, comparable across 
entities, and adequately disclosed. The ﬁ  nancial 
statement information seeks to provide an 
understanding of a ﬁ  rm’s value and the economic 
risks and potential rewards that it faces. This is 
a formidable task, especially for the ﬁ  nancial 
1  See Shin (H. S.) (2007). ARTICLES
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sector, given the globalisation of the ﬁ  nancial 
industry, rapid innovation, and the ever-increasing 
complexity of the instruments used. Furthermore, 
credit decisions and the allocation of capital depend 
on an assessment of ﬁ  rms’ proﬁ  tability, liquidity 
and solvency which are contained in published 
ﬁ  nancial statements. 
Historical cost accounting measures ﬁ  nancial assets 
and liabilities at their origination value. This can lead 
to inefﬁ  ciencies as adjustments are not made for 
subsequent changes in market value. Let us consider 
the value of an asset throughout a business cycle. 
During the upturn, the historical cost valuation may 
lead to an undervaluation of the asset, and conversely 
during the downturn the asset may be overvalued. 
Of particular concern for ﬁ  nancial stability has been 
the distorting of incentives during the downturn as 
the reductions in the true economic value of assets 
could be masked. It is commonly felt that had 
accounting reﬂ   ected underlying market values, 
the difﬁ  culties of US savings and loan institutions 
would have been recognised and addressed earlier,
and perhaps at lower ﬁ  scal cost.2
In response to the shortcomings of historical 
cost accounting, an alternate approach seeking 
to more accurately reﬂ   ect market valuations,
fair value accounting, has been introduced. Fair 
value seeks to provide a measure of the economic 
value of a transaction that is understood by 
interested stakeholders. In the United States, the 
accounting guidance clariﬁ   es that fair value is 
an exit price, representing “the price that would 
be received to sell an asset or paid to transfer 
a liability in an orderly transaction between 
market participants at the measurement date”. 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRSs)
deﬁ  nes fair value as the “amount for which an asset 
could be exchanged between knowledgeable willing 
parties in an arm’s length transaction”.
Let us now consider the value of an asset throughout 
the business cycle using fair value accounting. 
Marking-to-market assumes that ﬁ  nancial markets 
are efﬁ  cient and provide the best method to value 
a speciﬁ  c ﬁ  nancial asset. Under normal conditions, 
fair market valuation should meet its objective of 
providing information about a bank’s true risk proﬁ  le 
and promote market discipline. However, markets 
are subject to uncertainties and cyclical changes. 
To the extent that there are market tendencies to 
overshoot the underlying value of an asset both during 
upturns and downturns, the measured “fair” market 
value may diverge from the underlying economic 
value of an asset. In the upturn, asset price bubbles 
may be started by excess liquidity in the markets, 
which could then be compounded by remuneration 
and other incentives of market participants.
This may lead to procyclical, self-reinforcing, and 
self-extending “write-ups.” These valuation gains 
could lead to an increase in bank proﬁ  ts (see Chart 1) 
and capital, which in turn, through leveraging, could 
lead to further expansion of assets and liabilities 
either directly on their balance sheet or indirectly 
via specialised investment vehicles, and so on.
Why would such an expansion go unchecked? The 
upward revaluation of assets reﬂ  ected in bank proﬁ  ts 
may lead to pressures on bank management to distribute 
dividends, including unrealised gains on the assets on 
banks’ balance sheets. Because there is evidence that 
managers may try to produce smooth earnings per 
share, even if the initial change in market value was 
justiﬁ  ed by changes in fundamentals, management 
might distort their choice of projects in ways that will 
amplify these changes. Under these conditions, there 
may be little incentive for shareholders, uninsured 
depositors and other debt holders to identify the risk 
exposures taken by ﬁ  nancial institutions and put 
pressure on bank management to take corrective 
action at an early stage. 
Chart 1
US ﬁ  nancial sector proﬁ  ts versus expected proﬁ  ts


































Expected profits based on GDP data
Financial sector excess profits
Source: Deutsche Bank.
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It could be argued that in the upturn leading 
to the present crisis, liquidity risks were not 
properly taken into account. As a result, part of 
the recorded proﬁ  ts could have been liquidity 
risk premia that should have been provisioned.
An analysis of how these risk premia have behaved 
throughout the cycle may help to identify the need 
for some adjustments in valuations to mitigate any 
overvaluations in future cycles.
When the cycle turns, the downward revaluation
of assets may be rapid and severe (see Chart 2). The 
use of fair value accounting from the beginning of 
the cycle could itself exacerbate the overshooting 
of prices on the upside and therefore lead to a 
sharper fall during the downturn. Fair value reﬂ  ects 
the sum of all the risks the market assigns to the 
asset, including credit and liquidity risks. However, 
markets are not always sucessful in pricing risks 
appropriately, and thus the fair value will reﬂ  ect 
any overreaction of the market’s assessment of these 
risk components. This is in part due to the fact that 
valuations “need to reﬂ  ect current conditions and 
incorporate adjustments for risk, including liquidity, 
which other market participants would use to price 
the ﬁ  nancial instruments”.3
Accounting frameworks require professional judgment 
in determining the mechanisms for fair value, including 
the use of unobservable inputs in cases of the absence 
of an active market for an instrument. Such judgment 
allows the possibility of different outcomes for similar 
situations, which in times of market uncertainty may 
compound the risk of illiquidity (Global Financial 
Stability Report, April 2008). The interaction of fair 
value with speciﬁ  c covenants or triggers can further 
compound market illiquidity by leading to sales, 
margin calls or additional collateral requirements. As 
forced sales are triggered, fair valuations need to be 
applied across a number of portfolios even when there 
is no intention or need to sell at the full amount of the 
liquidity-induced discounts. This can further reduce 
ﬁ  nancial institutions’ supply of assets available for 
liquidity operations.
It should also be noted that fair value accounting 
is applied more extensively to ﬁ  nancial assets than 
ﬁ  nancial liabilities. This may produce accounting 
volatility that can disguise or distort the underlying 
economic substance. For example IAS 39 prevents 
the valuation of demand deposits at a value less 
than their face value, even if a signiﬁ  cant portion 
of these display the economic characteristics of a 
term deposit. Furthermore, the application of fair 
value accounting on liabilities such as debt issued 
by an entity may lead to counter-intuitive effects 
in the event of a credit down-grade as this would 
produce notional proﬁ  ts for the entity (producing 
gains when the valuation of liabilities worsens). 
This is of particular concern when a deterioration 
in a bank’s own credit worthiness, and the 
subsequent decline in value of own debt, results 
in proﬁ  ts and a false sense of improvement in the 
bank’s equity position. It also raises prudential 
concerns and raises signiﬁ  cant issues about the 
economic interpretation of this contradiction in a 
bank that is an ongoing concern.
IMPLICATIONS OF MODELING UNCERTAINTY
Fair value hierarchy prioritises the inputs to 
valuation techniques used to measure fair value. 
According to US GAAP, level 1 valuation requires 
observable prices for the same instrument in liquid 
markets. When observable prices are unavailable for 
the valuation date, level 2 valuation allows the use of 
prices on nearby dates, or the use of arbitrage-type
valuation models that use the observable prices of 
other ﬁ  nancial instruments or available indices. 
For instruments for which levels 1 and 2 valuations 
inputs are not available, level 3 valuation allows 
3  See Ernst and Young (2007).
Chart 2
















LossCapital LossCapital LossCapital LossCapital LossCapital
Q3 2007 Q4 2007 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Total Q3 2008
Note: Writedowns and credit losses for 2008:Q3 have not yet been fully 
reported.
Source: Bloomberg LLP. ARTICLES
Jaime Caruana and Ceyla Pazarbasioglu: “Revisiting valuation practices throughout the business cycle: some symmetry is needed”
Banque de France ￿ Financial Stability Review ￿ No. 12 – Valuation and ﬁ  nancial stability ￿ October 2008  19
the use of theoretical valuation models that use as 
inputs various relevant fundamental parameters 
(“mark-to-model” approach). As the chart shows, the 
use of levels 2 and 3 is quite signiﬁ  cant.
As valuation moves from market prices to
mark-to-model valuation, fair value accounting 
becomes less transparent and increasingly 
dependent on judgment, model assumptions and 
parameters, posing reliability challenges to which 
markets, particularly under distress, are sensitive. 
These “subjective” aspects of fair value accounting
may accentuate the severity of the crisis by 
compounding market illiquidity or price spirals
if they increase uncertainty around valuations.
In summary, weaknesses in models have also 
contributed to distorted valuations that may have 
reinforced market dynamics. However, it should be kept 
in mind that different market participants with similar 
models have behaved differently, indicating that failures 
in governance structures that support risk management 
and different assessments by management regarding 
market direction were also important.
CONSOLIDATION OF OFF-BALANCE SHEET ENTITIES
UNDER STRESS
During the lead-up to the present crisis, several 
ﬁ  nancial institutions seem to have not properly 
assessed the contingency risks which led to 
unexpected claims on their liquidity positions. In 
some cases, the consolidation of off-balance sheet 
claims were due to reputational concerns while in 
some others these claims represented contractual 
obligations and should have been consolidated in 
the ﬁ  rst place.
As both accounting and supervisory rules govern 
consolidation, common principles need to be 
established. While Basel I did not adequately cover 
asset securitisation, Basel II attempts to provide a 
comprehensive framework to capture the associated 
risks. In particular, for securitisation exposures, the 
“clean-break” criteria must be met and the supervisor 
has to be satisﬁ  ed that risk transfer has taken place. It 
should be noted that both International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) and Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) have moved promptly 
to address the underlying issues by substantially 
amending the relevant standards for consolidation 
and derecognition.
NEED FOR POLICY DIALOGUE AND SUGGESTIONS
FOR MOVING FORWARD
There are many factors that contributed to the dynamics 
of this crisis and it is likely that the procyclicality of 
fair market valuation is one of them. However, this 
does not validate the calls for abandoning fair value 
accounting during the downturn. After all, there were 
no such calls during the upturn. Changing accounting 
standards in the midst of the crisis could adversely 
affect investor conﬁ  dence and should be avoided. 
The main thesis of this article is that there is a need 
to enhance current accounting practices as part of 
a desirable set of reforms to strengthen ﬁ  nancial 
systems. The amendments should not be restricted to 
the downturn or to illiquid conditions in markets, but 
rather consider the dynamics throughout the cycle, 
with a particular focus on the upturn. Otherwise, there 
may be a risk that in the upturn, valuations could be 
exaggerated and ﬁ  nancial institutions may record as 
proﬁ  ts what in reality are risk premia that should be 
provisioned. This could distort the representation 
of the condition of the ﬁ   nancial institutions as 
well as create incentives that could exacerbate the 
subsequent upturn. Thus in both up and down cycles, 
fair value accounting should be structured so that it 
Chart 3
Fair value hierarchy
Aggregate fair value hierarchy – combines assets
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contributes to good risk management and ensures 
that ﬁ  nancial statements include adequate disclosure 
of methodologies, valuations and volatilities such 
that inherent uncertainties are well understood.
Going forward, there is a need for a policy dialogue 
between the accounting standard setters, the 
ﬁ  nancial industry, and supervisors. Given the 
systemic implications of ﬁ  nancial institutions, 
it is critical for these three stakeholders to join 
forces to better align risk management practices, 
supervisory regulations and accounting guidelines. 
While arriving at a ﬁ  nal solution will require further 
work, the following principles could provide a 
direction to the debate. 
A fair “fair value” with enhancements
The amendments to current accounting standards 
should take into account their implications on 
incentives and the information available for the asset. 
They should aim to contribute to, or at least should 
not impede, better risk management by ﬁ  nancial 
institutions as well as promote better regulation. 
The debate about proper valuation has been 
often framed in terms of reality and prudence. 
The present crisis has led to questions about the 
representation of “reality” by current valuation 
practices. It can be argued that these practices were 
not only less prudent than desirable, but led to a 
misrepresentation of the real risk proﬁ  le and the 
performance of ﬁ  nancial institutions. To the extent 
that assets and proﬁ  ts have been overvalued in good 
times, wrong incentives were created, leading to 
sharper declines in values and returns in bad times. 
As a result, in the medium term, shareholders, 
management, creditors, and regulators were not 
well-served. 
Balance sheet volatility arising from fair value 
accounting raises new challenges to ensure the 
maintenance of adequate capital buffers. Such 
buffers need to be considered through the cycle, 
augmenting the capital position during boom 
cycles to withstand the burden on capital that 
stems from economic downturns, reﬂ  ected in the 
enhanced risk of asset deterioration, rising loan 
delinquencies, lower recovery rates, and more 
difﬁ  cult funding conditions. However, it is often 
stated that creating buffers to deal with expected 
liquidity or credit risks could distort “the reality”. 
To some extent, this reﬂ  ects a tension between 
the accountant approach to ﬁ  nancial instruments 
valuation, the prudential approach, and the risk 
management approach. Usually this tension 
was mitigated by prudential regulators trying to 
accommodate some prudence within the limits 
allowed by the accounting rules, by accounting 
standard setters introducing minor changes in the 
standards, and by banks trying to exercise their risk 
management within the limits of the prudential 
and accounting rules. The crisis has shown that 
these partial solutions are not good enough, 
that much is at stake, and that it is necessary to 
resolve the tensions between valuation approaches 
across risk managers, accountants, and prudential 
supervisors and regulators, so as to ensure that 
accounting frameworks do not unduly contribute 
to potential ﬁ  nancial instability.
All this suggests that a consideration of a fair value 
should not only use the last transaction price but also 
the information available about its price volatility 
and its evolution through previous cycles. Given 
the doubts that can surround valuations, fair value 
estimates should be supplemented by information 
on a ﬁ   nancial instrument’s price history, the 
variance around the fair value calculations, and 
management’s forward-looking view of asset price 
progression and how it will impact the institution’s 
balance sheet. Taking into consideration these 
elements would enhance fair values and represent 
better the actual ﬁ  nancial situation of a ﬁ  rm. It could 
also close the gap with risk management practices 
and get much closer to the prudent valuation that 
ﬁ  nancial stability requires. All this information, 
under an objective framework, can be used to 
make these adjustments an integral part of the fair 
value process. Adjustments could be in the form of 
statistically supported cushions that reﬂ  ect actual 
risks contained in the portfolio.
Enhanced role of prudential supervisors
The role of prudential supervisors in reviewing the 
valuation and accounting of ﬁ  nancial instruments 
has been always a thorny area, leading to a wide range 
of different supervisory practices. Some argue that 
some aspects of the valuation of ﬁ  nancial products 
are accounting issues in which supervisors should 
not interfere, but instead ask for adjustments in their 
prudential domain. These may include increasing 
regulatory capital requirements, scrutinising more ARTICLES
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carefully internal processes and controls, as well as 
pricing and stress-testing methodologies. However, 
true and fair accounting rules are sometimes not 
supportive for applying forward-looking valuation 
and risk management principles. Both elements are 
important for prudential supervisors. Therefore it 
seems that one of the lessons is that convergence 
towards principles-based accounting is warranted, 
including a more active and better recognised role 
by supervisors in the valuation methodologies and 
provisioning of ﬁ  nancial institutions. 
Broader understanding
To further strengthen current valuation practices, 
there is a need to better understand the implications 
of accounting standards on incentives and on 
the behavior of ﬁ   nancial institutions through 
the cycle and in stress conditions. However,
one-time adjustments will not likely to be 
sufﬁ  cient. There is a need to make continuous 
efforts to understand and analyse the dynamics of 
the business cycle and the implications of ﬁ  nancial 
innovation, as part of the noise and uncertainties 
in ﬁ   nancial markets may be transferred to 
valuations and balance sheets more rapidly, and 
intensify the implications for solvency and more 
broadly, ﬁ   nancial stability. Better knowledge 
about the transmission channels will enhance the 
understanding of, and sensitivity to, risks. From the 
point of view of ﬁ  nancial stability, rapid evolution 
of events and accompanying market and balance 
sheet adjustments can lead to rapid changes in 
the solvency situation of ﬁ  nancial institutions.
This calls for mandating deeper analysis and 
stipulating higher standards in risk management.
Better information and disclosure
Better information and disclosure is needed in 
several areas: the risk proﬁ  le of the institution; 
the risk management process and governance of 
valuations; and a more comprehensive presentation 
of the adjustments and models used for valuation 
especially in complex ﬁ  nancial products. Banks 
should also provide better disclosure on instrument-
level sensitivity analysis (which would provide 
estimates of the effects of events that impact 
liquidity and volatility in various markets), at 
least for their largest exposures to structured 
instruments. US GAAP has no requirements for 
sensitivity disclosure for fair valued instruments. 
IFRS 7 (Financial Instruments: Disclosures) contain 
basic sensitivity analysis for general classes of risk
but not for speciﬁ  c classes of assets.
An international dimension
Finally, there is a need for cross-border consistency 
for the accounting frameworks as well as between 
the accounting and regulatory frameworks. In 
globalised ﬁ   nancial markets, the differences in 
approaches to deal with the issues discussed in this 
note are signiﬁ  cant. This in itself is a weakness 
of the system. It burdens unnecessarily the risk 
management process of ﬁ  nancial institutions and 
it may jeopardize the cross-border consistency that 
the global ﬁ  nancial stability requires.ARTICLES
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